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Abstract
This paper extends Malik’s (1990) analysis to the case where criminals’
avoidance eﬀorts and public expenditures in the detection of criminals are
strategic complements in the aggregate technology of control of illegal
behaviours. In this set up, we show that whenever criminals’ avoidance
eﬀorts are more sensitive to the frequency than to the severity of sanc-
tions, it is always socially eﬃcient to set the ﬁne at the maximal possible
level. However, several paradoxical consequences occur: there may exist
overdeterrence at optimum; more repressive policies lead to less arresta-
tions of oﬀenders while more crimes may be committed; at the same time,
the society may be closer to the ﬁrst best number of crimes.
Keywords: deterrence, avoidance activities, optimal enforcement of law.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D81, K42.
1 Introduction
Malik (1990) has initialy established that criminals’ avoidance activities1 may
explain the optimality of less than maximum ﬁnes, contradicting the classical
result of Becker (1968)2. The purpose of this note is to show that if criminals’
avoidance expenditures are more sensitive to the frequency than to the severity
of punishment, then the beckerian’ s view always holds3, but with paradoxical
∗I am thankful to the referee and the associated editor of the journal for helpful comments
and suggestions. Yannick Gabuthy also provided useful remarks on a previous draft of the
paper, and Jenny Monheim has aﬀorded assistance.
1Avoidance expenditures correspond to self-protection activities undertaken by criminals in
order to reduce the probability of being caught and punished by an enforcement agent. They
comprise installing radar detectors to avoid speeding tickets, lobbying politicians to relax the
enforcement of regulations, bribing an enforcement agent to let free a culprit, destroying or
covering up incriminating evidence, or investing in long and costly litigations and so on.
2See the surveys by Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000).
3In a sense, our paper is in the same spirit as Nielson’s (1998) one who challenged Polinsky
and Shavell (1979)’s argument, showing that if risk averse criminals are more sensitive to the
1consequences for enforcement authorities not previously described in the litera-
ture. On the one hand, some level of overdeterrence may be socially optimal. On
the second, raising the ﬁne may lead to a decrease in the level of deterrence. We
will show that this may occur when criminals’ avoidance eﬀorts and public ex-
penditures in deterrence are strategic complements in the aggregate technology
of detection of illegal activities4, meaning that the higher public expenditures
in crime deterrence, the higher criminals’ own avoidance eﬀorts.
Thus, the paper suggests that the ﬁne tuning of crime deterrence is far more
uncertain than in standard models of law enforcement, adding to Sanchirico’s
(2006) recent analysis of the social cost of avoidance activities. When criminals’
avoidance detection is taken into account, more repressive policies lead to less
arrestations and less sanctions of oﬀenders, but may also result in to less deter-
rence of oﬀenses (more crimes). We show that paradoxically in such cases, the
eﬀectiveness of public policies may increase since the economy may be closer to
the ﬁrst best eﬃcient level of deterrence (number of crimes).
For the sake of concreteness, consider the following example of speed limit
violations: potential oﬀenders have the opportunity to install radar detectors
to avoid speeding tickets, which render them very sensitive to the frequency of
police controls on roads. Notice that in such a case, the higher the tickets, the
larger the incentives for oﬀenders to buy such detectors. Nevertheless, given
that such technology renders them very reactive to speed limit controls and less
sensitive to penalties, high tickets are still optimal. At the same time, higher
tickets may require more frequent controls on roads in order to maintain a given
level of deterrence: this is because the use of radar detectors allows oﬀenders
to escape from police detection and sanction, and enforcers must compensate
this with more eﬀorts in monitoring drivers’ behaviour. Putting it diﬀerently,
it may not be eﬃcient for the enforcers to substitute more frequent controls on
roads by higher speeding tickets since drivers using radar detectors avoid police
controls and detection, thus reducing the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of controls.
To summarise, increasing the ﬁne of speeding tickets has at least two diﬀerent
adverse eﬀects when radar detectors are bought by drivers: on the one hand, the
observed number of drivers cimmitting speed limit violations who are caught
and punished becomes smaller and smaller (police controls become less and less
eﬃcient); on the other hand, the eﬀective number of speed limit violations may
also become larger and larger (police controls may imply less and less deterrence
eﬀects on roads).
The paper analyses the driving force behind these results: criminals’ avoid-
ance expenditures always increase when enforcement authorities undertake more
repressive policies. Thus, any increase in the maximal ﬁne has a direct (posi-
tive) eﬀect on the level of deterrence, plus an indirect and negative eﬀect since
certainty than to the risk of punishment, then maximal ﬁnes are still optimal. It seems that
there exists some emprirical evidence which is consistent with such an assumption: see Block
and Gerety (1995) and Grogger (1991). Becker (1968) and Nielson and Winter (1997) argue
that the expected utility assumption does not allow to rationalize these observations.
4Malik(1990) assumed that criminals’ avoidance eﬀorts are independant of public expen-
ditures in deterrence.
2as criminals invest more on avoidance detection, it decreases the eﬀective prob-
ability of arrestation. Whether the direct eﬀect is dominating or in contrast is
dominated by the other one depends on the sensitivity of the avoidance activ-
ities with respect to the probability and the severity of sanctions. Moreover,
the higher the cost of avoidance for criminals, the more likely the occurrence
of overdeterrence. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes the basic model and analyses criminals’ individual behaviour. Section 3
focuses on the optimal law enforcement issue and presents the main results of
the paper. Section 4 brieﬂy concludes.
2 A model of criminals’ avoidance activities
2.1 the technology of arrestation and conviction
Let us consider the case where illegal activity allows the criminal to obtain a
payment equal to b > 0, but imposes an externality cost D > 0 on the society.
When caught, the oﬀender has to pay a ﬁne f > 0. Let us denote by p the level
of public expenditures in the monitoring of the criminals’ activity, which may
be understood as the frequency of public control. Nevertheless, the probability
of arrestation and conviction is less than p, since criminals have the opportunity
to invest in avoidance activities.
Let the aggregate technology of arrestation and conviction be characterized
by the probability function q = q(p,x), x being the criminal’s eﬀorts of conceal-
ing the illegal activity and avoiding public controls. We also assume that the
monetary equivalent of the utility cost of this eﬀort is equal to x. The proba-
bility q corresponds to the eﬀective probability of arrestation and sanction, and
satisﬁes:
Assumption 1:
1) q(p,0) = p, ∀p with: q(0,x) = 0;
2) qp > 0; qpp < 0;
3) qx < 0; qxx > 0;
4) qxp < 0.
Conditions 1.2 and 1.3 say that i) the probability of criminals’ arrestation
and convinction increases with public monitoring, but decreases with private
avoidance; and that ii) there exist decreasing returns to scale both in avoidance
and in public monitoring. Finally, condition 1.4 says that private avoidance
and public expenditures in monitoring are strategic complements in the aggre-






q ≤ 1, which is straightforward to proove given the concavity of the
probability of criminals’ arrestation and convinction with respect to public mon-
itoring.
32.2 avoidance activity and criminals’ behaviour
The maximum expected beneﬁt obtained by the criminal when he undertakes
the illegal activity and makes avoidance eﬀorts is equal to:
u ≡ max
x (b − q(p,x)f − x) (1)
Assuming that qx(p,0)f +1 > 0, the crimiminal’s optimal avoidance expen-
ditures are given by the (necessary and suﬃcient) condition:
−qx(p,x∗)f = 1 (2)
as long as u > 0. According to (2), the optimal value of expenditures in
avoidance activities is set such that the marginal cost of eﬀort compensates the
decrease in the expected value of the penalty.
By the implicit function theorem, it is easy to see that sign∂x∗
∂p = sign(−qxp)
and sign∂x∗
∂f = sign(−qx); thus, the optimal x∗ is unambiguously increasing
with f and p. The value of the illegal beneﬁt b matters only in the sense
that it inﬂuences the decision to engage or not in the illegal activity and to
undertake the avoidance expenditures. There exists a threshold value of the
beneﬁt b∗ ≡ q(p,x∗)f + x∗ > 0 such that the illegal activity is performed only
if b > b∗. All else equal, deterrence occurs as far as u ≤ 0 or equivalently:
b ≤ b∗. Given that individuals are not erroneously caught, they do not engage
in avoidance activities once they do not engage in the illegal activity.
3 Optimal enforcement of the law
3.1 the eﬃcient probability/penalty tradeoﬀ
Let us assume that public authorities do not observe b nor the eﬀort under-
taken by the individuals5. They just know that b is distributed according to a
cumulative distribution function G(b) taking values on [0,∞), with a density
g(b) > 0 everywhere. On the other hand, whatever the private beneﬁt for the
criminal, the loss for the rest of the society satisﬁes D < ∞. The management
costs associated with the monetary penalty are negligeable, but monitoring the
criminal activity entails a cost equal to m(p), satisfying m￿ > 0 and m￿￿ ≥ 0.
The issue for the government is to choose a ﬁne (monetary sanction) f and a
probability of control p (leading to the eﬀective probability of detection and
convinction q(p,.) ≤ p), in order to maximize the social welfare function6:
5We do not consider the case where the enforcement authority undertakes costly activities
to learn this type. Malik (1990) and Bebchuk and Kaplow (1993) show that this would allow
to apply diﬀerent ﬁnes to diﬀerent oﬀenders. Nalebuﬀ and Scharfstein (1987) suggest more
generally that "testing" to discover criminals’ characteristics may overcome the ineﬃciency
coming from asymmetric information.
6That criminals’ welbeing - their illegal gain - appears in the social welfare is controversial
(Levin and Trumbull (1990), Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000)). In order




(b − D)dG(b) − (1 − G(b∗))x∗ − m(p)
with x∗ satisfying (2), and under the constraint7 f ≤ F. The ﬁrst (integral)
term in W corresponds to the expected private beneﬁt associated with the illegal
activity (beneﬁt of the criminals minus the external cost). The two other terms
are the cost of avoidance activities per criminal, and the cost of monitoring
for public authorities. As far as the ﬁne corresponds here to a simple transfer
between the (risk neutral) criminal and the government, they do not appear in
the social welfare function - they have no value from a social point of view.
The solution to this problem (see Malik (1990)) may be no deterrence (for
example, in the case of small values of the external cost of crime and/or large
values of the public cost of monitoring), complete deterrence (opposite con-
ditions) or conditional deterrence (if both the external cost of crime and the
public monitoring cost are large enough in order to make the controle of crim-
inals socially worth, but not to deter all of them). We focus here on this last
case.
The solution with conditional deterrence (b∗,p∗,f∗) is characterized by the
ﬁrst order conditions of maximization:
g(b∗)q∗








where q∗ = q(p∗,x∗), with λ = 0 if f < F but λ ≥ 0 otherwise, and
b∗ ≡ q∗f∗ +x∗. They are necessary and suﬃcient as long as function m and/or
function q exhibit suﬃciently decreasing returns to scale. Let us denote as ex
f
the elasticity of the criminal’s eﬀort with respect to the ﬁne, and ex
p the elas-
ticity of the criminal’s eﬀort with respect to public monitoring. The following
proposition shows that the values of these elasticities play a key role8.




p, the maximum ﬁne f∗ = F is optimal, and the probability p∗
must be set as small as possible.
could introduce a discounting factor on illegal beneﬁts. Another solution would be to minimize
the social cost of crime under a constrained level of utility for criminals. Formally, both are
equivalent to the conventional approach used in the text.
7This is a natural assumption since criminals have a disutility from the avoidance eﬀort.
Introducing a monetary cost of eﬀort would not signiﬁcantly alter the results and main conclu-
sions, although it would require us to modify the deﬁnition of the maximal ﬁne (i.e. f < F−x)
in order to take into account that wealth and the costly eﬀort would now be perfect substi-
tutes. Thus, the slight modiﬁcation that would be obtained corresponds to the case where
the constraint is binding, inducing a level of deterrence at optimum (i.e. ¯ b = qF + (1 − q)x)
which is smaller than under the disutility cost of eﬀort assumption.
8All the proofs are in the appendix.
5ii) If ex
f > ex
p, it may be optimal to choose f∗ < F.
iii) The optimal expected ﬁne is smaller than the external cost of crime
(q∗f∗ < D), and there may exist either over or under deterrence at optimum
(b∗ ≡ q∗f∗ + x∗ ≷ D).
Malik’s (1990) model allows only case ii). Hence, results i) and iii) deserve
more speciﬁc discussion.
To illustrate i), assume that initially f < F, and consider that enforcement
authorities decrease the probability of control and just compensate it by an
increase in the ﬁne in order to keep the level of deterrence b∗ = qf+x∗ constant.
Thus, the total eﬀect on social welfare can be written:










When criminals’ eﬀorts are more sensitive to the probability than to the severity
of the punishment (i.e. the ﬁne), then a decrease in the probability of control
leads to a decrease in the (private) cost of avoidance activities that more than
compensates the increase in cost which is associated with the even higher ﬁne;
moreover, it adds to the cost cut associated with the public monitoring activity,
thus improving the social welfare.
The second result (iii) means that although the expected ﬁne is always
smaller than the external cost of crime at the optimum, the cost of private
avoidance activities may be large enough to induce a level of deterrence greater
than the external cost of crime, implying an excessive level of deterrence at
optimum; however, the opposite result may arise. It is important to notice
that whether individual avoidance expenditures are more or less sensitive to the
frequency than to the penalty is irrelevant for this last (ambiguous) result.
3.2 on the eﬀectiveness of public policies
The eﬀect pointed out in Sanchirico’s (2006) analysis also holds in our model:
any increase in public expenditures in deterrence gives incentives to criminals
to undertake more avoidance expenditures, which has an adverse eﬀect on the
eﬀective probability of arrestation. Here, we add to it, investigating whether the
enforcement authority has the opportunity or not to reach a ﬁne tuning of the
level of optimal deterrence. First, we have the following result:
Proposition 2 Consider a solution where f∗ = F.
i) An increase in the maximal ﬁne may yield an increase or a decrease in
the optimal probability.
ii) Moreover, assume that F is small enough to give a large level of underde-
terrence; then the optimal probability and the maximal ﬁne may be substitutes.
iii) On the contrary, even if F is large enough to produce a level of deterrence
arbitrarly close to full internalization of the external cost of crime, the optimal
probability and the maximal ﬁne may be complements.
6Given that criminals’ expenditures in avoidance detection are sensitive both
to the probability and to the severity of sanction, the general ﬁnding i) is hardly
a surprise. Nevertheless, what proposition 3 makes clear is that the probability
and the ﬁne may be either substitutes or complements whatever the initial
level of deterrence, which is in contrast with the usual results obtained in the
canonical set up (Garoupa (2001)). The driving force behind these results is that
any increase in the maximum level of the ﬁne all else held equal has a direct and
positive eﬀect on the level of deterrence, plus an indirect and negative eﬀect;
the latter reﬂects that as the ﬁne increases, criminals invest more on avoidance
activities, implying that the eﬀective probability of arrestation and sanction
decreases.
Consider for example a situation where the maximal ﬁne is very large, such
that the level of deterrence is close to the full internalization of crime (b∗ →
D); in such an event, increasing the ﬁne entails a large increase in criminals’
avoidance expenditures, and it may be socially worth compensating the induced
impact on the eﬀective probability of sanction by an increase in the optimal
probability of control. In the opposite case with a low level of the maximal ﬁne
(F → 0, meaning criminals’ assets are small), the level of crime deterrence is also
very low (b∗ → 0). Thus, the social beneﬁts coming from the increase in the level
of deterrence associated with the larger ﬁne may be more than compensated by
the decrease in the eﬀective frequency of sanction coming from the increase in
the criminal’s private cost of avoidance, requiring that the optimal probability
be reduced.
The next issue is the impact of monetary sanctions on the level of deterrence
at optimum.
Proposition 3 Consider a solution where f∗ = F.
i) An increase in the maximal ﬁne always yields an increase in the threshold
of deterrence when the probability and the ﬁne are complements at optimum,
whereas the eﬀect is ambiguous in the case where they are substitutes.
ii) If qxp = 0, then an increase in the maximal ﬁne always yields an increase
in the threshold of deterrence.
iii) If qxp < 0, then an increase in the maximal ﬁne may lead to a decrease
in the threshold of deterrence.
Once more, this ﬁnding is in contrast with the usual results obtained in the
canonical set up (Garoupa (2001)), where the expected ﬁne is an increasing
function of the maximal ﬁne, irrespectively of the fact that the sanction and the
probability are complements rather than substitutes.
First notice that the ambiguity only arises when the maximal ﬁne and the
probability of control are substitutes (see i)): whether the direct eﬀect of the
increase in the ﬁne dominates or in contrast is dominated by the second one
depends on the sensitivity of the avoidance activities with respect to the prob-
ability as shown by results ii)9 and iii). Speciﬁcally, the larger the elasticity of
9Which corresponds to Malik’s assumption.
7criminals’ avoidance expenditures with the probability, the larger the likelihood
that the level of deterrence decreases with the maximal ﬁne (see iii)).
A straightforward consequence of proposition 3 is the following:
Corollary 4 An increase in the maximal ﬁne always yields a decrease (respec-
tively, an increase) in the level of underdeterrence (overdeterrence) when the
probability and the ﬁne are complements at optimum, whereas the eﬀect is am-
biguous in the case where they are substitutes.
4 Final remarks
We have shown the existence of several uncomfortable albeit unavoidable con-
sequences that arise for enforcers when criminals invest in avoidance activities,
which adds to Sanchirico’s recent analysis. Speciﬁcaly, when public invesments
in deterrence and criminals’ avoidance expenditures are strategic complements
in the aggregate technology of crimes detection, we have found a great degree
of ambiguity and indetermination 1/ concerning the optimal tradeoﬀ between
the probability and the severity of punishment - excepted when criminals are
more sensitive to the risk of control than to the severity of punishment (an eﬀect
absent from Malik’s (1990) paper), or 2/ with respect to their complementar-
ity versus substitutability, as well as 3/ with respect to the level of deterrence
reached since the existence of avoidance investments by criminals may result in
underdeterrence as well as in overdeterrence.
Hence, as far as detection avoidance is a by-product of criminal activities,
the ﬁne tuning of illegal activities by enforcement authorities appears as a very
controversial issue: in fact, we obtain ambiguous prescriptions from a practical
point of view. The basic reason is that depending on the technology of detection
avoidance available for criminals, they become more or less sensitive to the
frequency of punishment relatively to the severity of punishment; and depending
on the cost of this detection avoidance, there may exist over or under deterrence.
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APPENDIX
Proof of proposition 2
Let us consider a solution where the optimal ﬁne satisﬁes f∗ < F. Substi-



















. Hence, there are
two cases:
A/ assume that ex∗
f × eq
p − ex∗
p ≤ 0: given that eq
p ≤ 1, this condition is
satisﬁed for example (but not uniquely) when for all (p,f) we have ex
f ≤ ex
p;
then, the LHS in (5) would be negative, meaning that any positive value for p
implies a loss of social welfare: thus f∗ < F cannot be optimal. Then assume
that f∗ = F; using (3), p∗ must be set as low as possible according to the
condition:
g(b∗)q∗




B/ assume now that ex∗
f × eq
p − ex∗
p > 0; obviously, this occurs for example
(but not uniquely) when ex∗
p = 0 (which occurs when qxp = 0). More generally,
9in order to hold, the inequality ex∗
f ×eq
p −ex∗
p > 0 requires (condition necessary
but not suﬃcient) that for all (p,f) we have ex
f > ex
p. Then it may be optimal
to choose f∗ < F, although, there are cases where it is not.
Finally, since the RHS of (3) is positive, we obtain that D > q∗f∗ both
when f∗ = F or f∗ < F; hence, there may exist at optimum either over or
under deterrence since b∗ = q∗f∗ + x∗ ≷ D, which depends on the private cost
of avoidance borne by criminals.
Proof of proposition 3
It is suﬃcient to give the proof only for speciﬁc cases. For ease of exposition,
assume that qxp = 0 (which implies that x∗ does not depend on p). In contrast,
it is easy to verify that when avoidance expenditures are sensitive to public
detection, additional terms appear which make more likely that WpF takes a
positive sign. This is left to the reader.
Applying the implicit function theorem to (3) with qxp = 0, we obtain that
sign
∂p∗


























with: e = −
g￿(b∗)
g(b∗) q∗F denoting to the elasticity of the density with respect






negative soon as the elasticity term satisﬁes e ≥ 1. But the last term is always
positive. It is easy to see that the condition e ≤
D−2q∗F
D−q∗F ⇔ q∗F ≤ 1−e
2−e is
suﬃcient (but not necessary) to obtain that the probability and the ﬁne are
complementary instruments (i.e. WpF > 0). On the other hand (in contrast to
Garoupa (2001)), the condition e > 1 is no longer suﬃcient to obtain that the
probability and the ﬁne are substitutable instruments (i.e. WpF < 0).
ii) To go a little further, assume that F → 0 (criminals are poor), such that
q∗F → 0: hence, as far as criminals entail a small cost of avoidance (in the
limit we also obtain: x∗ → 0) when they face low sanctions in case of detection,
there exists a large degree of underdeterrence at optimum (b∗ → 0). As a result,
WpF = g(b∗)q∗
p {1 − e}D < 0 soon as e > 1, meaning that both instruments are
substitutes near any arbitrary small level of deterrence.
iii) On the contrary, assume that b is uniformaly distributed (hence g(b) =
cst) and that the maximal possible level of ﬁne is large enough to induce a
level of deterrence which is close to full internalization of the cost of crime at
optimum (b∗ → D); then: WpF = g(b∗)q∗
p
￿





soon as x∗ ≥ q∗F, meaning that when the cost of avoidance is large enough,
both instruments are complements even near full internalization of the cost of
the crime.
10Proof of proposition 4
It is straightforward to show that:
∂b∗
∂F








As a result, ∂b∗
∂F is always positive when the probability and the ﬁne are
complements at optimum (i.e. −
WpF












ii) Given that ∂x∗
∂p = 0 when qxp = 0, we obtain:
q∗
pFWpF − q∗Wpp = g(b∗)q∗2










which is always positive.
iii) On the other hand, when we assume that qxp < 0, additional terms
appear which depend on ∂x∗
∂p (it is easy to verify that some of them are negative),
∂2x∗
∂p∂F or ∂2x∗
∂p2 (they have an ambiguous sign, which may be solved with more
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